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Abstract - Covert Channels can be used for enabling hidden 
communication mechanisms that can facilitate secret message 
transfer. This paper presents a new covert channel based on 
the HTML source of a webpage. The new covert channel while 
featuring high bandwidth also demonstrates high 
imperceptibility as it doesn’t involve any modifications to the 
source or the visibility of the webpage and is independent of 
timing of page requests. The availability of page source for a 
webpage on the Internet makes this covert channel easy to 
implement and effective. 
Keywords: Network Security, Covert Channels, Information 
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1 Introduction 
  Covert channel were first defined by Lampson as a 
communication channel that was not intended for information 
transfer [1]. This covert channel, defined in 1973, was based 
on trusted host systems but can be applied to any shared 
environment. Covert channel research has migrated into many 
other environments since then such as networked services. 
 
The DoD’s Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
(TCSEC) [2] describes a covert channel as a communication 
channel that facilitates transfer of information between entities 
in such a manner that the system’s security policy is violated. 
They also mention that the presence of a communication 
channel cannot be supported without the complete knowledge 
of the channel. A relatively recent definition states that a 
covert channel can be established by hiding and transmitting 
data over a legitimate communication channel [3]. 
 
Covert channels can be classified into three types: Storage 
Channels, Timing Channels and Behavioral Channels [4].  
Covert storage channels include communicating entities that 
are involved in a direct or indirect form of writing to/reading 
from a storage location. Covert timing channels are described 
as scenarios where a process signals information to another 
process by modulating its own use of system resources in such 
a manner that the real response time observed by the second 
process is affected [2].  Behavioral type of channels are 
generally application specific wherein the behavior of an 
application is used to define and communicate information 
between the participating entities of the covert channel [4].   
 
A typical HTML page on the Internet consists of HTML tags, 
regular text and URLs linking to other pages. In order to 
implement our covert channel, we utilize the text and the 
URLs available in the HTML source of a webpage. The fact 
that an existing webpage’s source can be used to build a 
message dictionary without modifying any content illustrates 
the advantage this covert channel possesses. The purpose of 
this project was to demonstrate a practical covert channel that 
is difficult to be detected by an active administrator or a 
regular observer. Further, the administrator or the observer 
should not be able to understand the covert message if 
discovered. 
2 Paper Organization 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 3 discusses the literature review which mentions 
existing work in HTML based covert channels. Section 4 
details the design, methodology and experiments. Section 5 
presents the characteristics of the proposed covert channel. 
Section 6 discusses the future work. Finally, Section 7 
presents the summary of this new covert channel. 
 
3 Literature Review 
         Previous works have discussed and implemented covert 
channels based on HTML. These works include embedding  
invisible characters into the html source, using uppercase and  
lowercase of letters in html tags, using attributes of html  
elements, etc [5], [6], [7], [8].  The method that involves 
embedding invisible characters into html source denotes white 
space as 0 and tab as 1.  The invisible characters are 
embedded into the webpage by adding white spaces and tabs 
at the end of sentences or lines [6]. This method is simple to 
implement however, issues associated with this methods 
include: high perceptibility as a result of increase in webpage 
size, need to modify the web page source, and it is easier to 
destroy the steganographic covert channel by deleting 
additional white spaces and tabs. The second method is 
implemented by switching the case of the letters in html 
elements called tags [5]. The secret message was embedded by 
utilizing the letter case where uppercase letters were used to 
represent the binary value 1 and lowercase letters were 
referred to as 0. This method doesn’t lengthen the size of a 
webpage but the switched case of the letters can be used to 
decode the embedded message. This covert channel can be 
broken by converting all the tag letters to uppercase or 
lowercase format. The third method takes advantage of the 
attributes of the HTML elements. The attributes of an element 
in HTML can be used in any order without effecting the 
webpage content and visibility. The authors Dongsheng Shen 
and Hong Zhao used a mapping scheme between permutations 
of attributes and binary strings to implement an embedding 
and extracting process thereby achieving information hiding 
[7]. This method doesn’t increase the webpage size and is 
relatively robust. Another attribute based webpage information 
hiding scheme described in [8] makes use of the property 
“equal attribute object has identical function” to define a set of 
rules for embedding and extracting secret information.  
 
The following covert channel mechanisms closely relate to our 
proposed covert channel. William Huba et al. briefly discuss a 
covert channel based on the webpage browsing pattern [9] 
which is currently unimplemented. Erik Brown et al. presented 
three techniques to implement covert channels using webpage 
browsing patterns [10]. In the first technique, a value 0 or 1 is 
assigned for a page request on the basis of its distance from 
the root node. In the second mechanism, every page of the 
web site is designated as 0 or 1. The third mechanism denotes 
values 0 if the pattern of the page requests were in breadth-
first search format while a depth-first search would indicate 
the value 1.  
 
The discussed mechanisms offer low bandwidth and hence do 
not facilitate high capacity channels. Our approach 
demonstrates the characteristics of imperceptibility and 
robustness without compromising on the channel capacity. 
Unlike the first three studies mentioned above which 
implement unidirectional channel from the web server to the 
client, our work focuses on establishing a unidirectional 
communication channel from client to web server. In addition 
it focuses on using words available in the webpage as message 
components and URLs available in the webpage for enabling 
covert transfer of the message without any modifications to the 
existing source of web pages. 
 
4 Proposed Covert Channel 
4.1 Design 
 The proposed covert channel establishes a unidirectional 
communication scheme between the communicating entities. 
Typically, the communicating entities of this covert channel 
are a web server, as receiver, and a web client, as the sender. 
For any covert channel to be implemented successfully, 
certain information must be shared between the 
communicating parties prior to transferring of covert 
messages. In this scenario, the sending entity and the 
receiving entity share three things: a webpage, sender’s (web 
client) IP and the encoding mechanism. It is important to 
understand that in the current proposal the receiver is 
implemented at the web server and hence the receiving entity 
must own the web server or must have compromised the web 
server. But the covert channel can be implemented beyond the 
mentioned scenario. For example, the covert channel can be 
implemented for scenarios where the receiver exists between 
the web client and the web server. This man-in-the-middle 
receiver captures HTTP requests from the sender in order to 
decode the messages based on the requested pages. An 
advantage of this approach is that the receiver need not have 
control over a web server and any webpage could be selected 
rather than a webpage from the owned or compromised 
server.  This overcomes the limitation of selecting a webpage 
from a web server that is either owned or compromised by the 
receiving entity. However, in this paper we restrict our study 
to owned/compromised web server as the receiver. 
4.2 Methodology and Experiments 
 The methodology section details how the encoding and 
decoding operations are performed by the sender and the 
receiver respectively. In order to present the feasibility and 
practicality of our webpage source based covert channel, a 
proof of concept was developed in python. The 
implementation includes two scripts wherein one of the scripts 
is used to carry out encoding on the web client while the other 
is responsible for decoding the message at the web server.  
 
1) Sender Side: The sender side implementation of this covert 
channel can be described as the following phases.  
 
Phase 1: URL Dictionary: The first task is to obtain and read 
and parse the webpage source. We build the URL dictionary, 
as illustrated in Fig. 1, by assigning numbers (termed as URL 
numbers) to a uniquely sorted list of URLs identified from the 
webpage source. The URL numbers act as keys and the URLs 
represent their values. If there are n URLs retrieved from the 
webpage, every URL is mapped to a number starting from 0 to 
n-1. We reserve the first three URLs, termed as Control URLs, 
to define activities such as indication of start or end of a 
covert message transfer. The purpose of each Control URL is 




URL Number Indication 
0 Start of communication 
1 Wait for next URL 
2 End of communication 
3 to N-1 A word or a shift 
URL Number : URL 
3 : http://www.rit.edu/alumni.html 
4 : http://www.rit.edu/alumni_photos.html 
5 : http://www.rit.edu/campuslife.html 
6 : http://www.rit.edu/centers.html 
7 : http://www.rit.edu/co-op.html 
8 : http://www.rit.edu/colleges.html 
Figure 1. A sample from URL Dictionary built using RIT’s 
homepage 
 
Phase 2: Word List & Mapping: In addition to the retrieval of 
URLs, we also retrieve words from the webpage source and 
uniquely sort the list of words in alphabetical order. The word 
dictionary is obtained by mapping words from this word list to 
the URL number(s) as demonstrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.  
 
It is likely that in a webpage, the number of URLs would be 
less than the number of words in most cases, so we use the 
following approach to map the words and URLs. The purpose 
of linking URLs to words is to send or receive a word of the 
message based on the URL requests. Tthe URL numbers {0}, 
{1} and {2} are reserved for representing control URLs so we 
begin mapping the words from URL number {3}.. We make 
use of Single URL mapping and Multiple URL mapping 
techniques to link URLs and words. In the Single URL 
mapping technique, a word is linked directly to only one URL 
while in the Multiple URL Mapping technique a word is 
linked to a sequence of URLs. Starting alphabetically, the 
words are assigned single URLs from {3} through {n-1} to 
indicate the word desired.  Then we utilize the URLs {3} 
through {n-1} again as shift indicators followed by the URL 
{1} to indicate the the preceding URL was a shift and not a 
word.  This sequence is then followed by another URLfrom 
{3} to {n-1}to indicate the word desired.  So, some words in 
the word dictionary (like “about” shown in Fig. 2) are mapped 
to a single URL and hence it takes only one URL request to 
convey such words. Other words of the word dictionary are 
mapped to multiple URLs (like “research in Fig.3). These 
words are conveyed by requesting the shift URL and a Wait 
URL followed by the word URL. The wait URL is used to 
indicate that for this particular word there exists multiple 
URLs mapped to it. Hence the receiver program must examine 
the URL following each initial URL to determine if it is a 
single or sequence of URLs.  If a URL is followed 
immediately by a Wait URL then it is a mutliple URL or 
sequence.. In the example presented, “about” takes only one 
URL request which is URL number {3} while “research” 
requires three URL requests which are URL number {12} 
followed by the URL number {1}, which is the Wait URL (to 
indicate there is more than one URL mapped to the word 
research), and URL number {48}.  The URL {12} being 
followed by the URL {1} indicates that it is a multiple URL or 
sequence and that the next URL indicates the specific word 
 
The Wait URL allows this scheme to represent (n-3) single 
URL encodings and (n-3)*(n-3) multiple URL encoded words.  
Therefore if we have n URLs in the webpage we can encode a 
maximum number of words of 
 




Phase 3: User Input: The final phase at the sender’s side 
would include accepting URL numbers (mapped to words) 
from the sender in order to invoke respective URL requests.  
 
Word : URL Number 
about : (3) 
abroad : (4) 
academic : (5) 
academicaffairs : (6)    
Figure 2. Single URL Mapping Sample 
 
Word : URL Numbers 
requirements : (12, 1, 47) 
research : (12, 1, 48) 
researcher : (12, 1, 49) 
reserved : (12, 1, 50) 
Figure 3. Multiple URL Mapping Sample 
 
This way for every word of the covert message, mapped 
URL(s) are accessed. With reference to Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, for 
sending the covert message “about research”, we must input 
the URLs {3} for about and {12, 48} for research. The same 
is illustrated in Fig. 4.  
 
Words Available: 715 
Total Available URLs: 51 
Please enter the number of words you want to send: 2 
Do you want to send a covert message now: [yes/no]? Yes 
Start URL Sent 
Instructions: 
 1.enter the URL numbers mapped to the WORDS 
 2.use space if multiple URL numbers are mapped to a WORD 
word 1 – URL Number(s): 3 
word 2 – URL Number(s): 12 48 
END URL Sent 
Covert message sent!!! 
Figure 4. Send Covert Message 
 
2) Receiver Side: The implementation on the receiver side is 
identical to the server side implementation except that the key-
value pairs built for the dictionaries are reversed to facilitate 
decoding of covert message.  
 
Phase 1: URL Dictionary: The first phase for both the sender 
and receiver are the same as it involves building a dictionary 
of URLs from the webpage that was decided prior to the 
communication. However, structurally the key, value pair of 
dictionary is reversed. In this implementation, the URL acts as 
the key while the numbers act as their corresponding values.  
 
Phase 2: Word List & Mapping: After building the URL 
dictionary as mentioned above, the receiver builds a word list 
and then performs word-URL number mapping but in this case 
the URL number acts as key and its corresponding values are 
the words parsed from the webpage source.  
 
Phase 3: Retrieval (PCAP/Apache Log): The final phase of the 
program on the receiver side is responsible for retrieving the 
message and displaying it to the receiver. This phase requires 
an additional input which is the packet capture file (.pcap) in 
our case. An apache access.log file is an alternative option. 
The reason for implementing using a packet capture is to 
imply that such a mechanism can be incorporated for other 
scenarios where a man-in-the-middle receiver, which is a 
system between the web client and web server, is the covert 
message receiver and captures the HTTP requests to decode 
the covert message. On receiving the packet capture file and 
sending entity’s IP address as input, the receiver program 
retrieves the URLs requested by the sender from the packet 
capture and utilizes these URLs to decode the message sent as 
shown in Fig. 5. 
 
H:\>python read.py 
Enter your web page: http://www.rit.edu 
Enter PCAP path: c:\captures\ritcovert.pcap 
Enter Sender’s IP: 192.168.0.6 
Covert Message: about research 
Figure 5. Receive Covert Message 
 
5 Covert Channel Characteristics 
5.1 Type 
 The proposed covert channel falls under the category of 
covert storage channel. This is because the sender’s URL 
requests are captured in pcap (packet capture) file or the web 
server log and the receiver reads the packet capture or web 
server log to decode the message obtained.  
5.2 Imperceptibility 
 It is very difficult for a regular observer or a capable 
administrator to detect the proposed covert channel as existing 
content of the webpage source and legitimate URL requests 
are utilized for its implementation and no alterations are made 
to the source code. 
5.3 Robustness 
 The robustness of this channel is high considering the 
channel’s ability of being persistent in the presence of 
firewalls, proxy servers, routers, etc. The message transfer is 
carried out by accessing URLs which are basically mapped to 
words using the encoding scheme. Since these URLs are 
legitimate HTTP requests they are not deterred by devices 
mentioned above. 
5.4 Throughput 
 With reference to the word-URL mapping example 
described in the previous section, sending each word of the 
message takes either one or three URL requests. Every word 
either takes one or three URL requests as some words are 
mapped to a single URL and would hence require only one 
URL request while other words mapped to two URLs are 
implemented by requesting first URL followed by Wait URL 
and then the second URL. Considering this, a message having 
10 words would take 10-30 URL requests excluding the Start 
URL and the End URL. This clearly indicates that the 
proposed covert channel demonstrates much higher bandwidth 
unlike the existing HTML based covert channels. Table II 
presents the number of URLs and words parsed from some 









www.rit.edu 730 51 
www.cnn.com 1753 119 
www.premierleague.com 931 174 
 
5.5 Prevention 
 The imperceptibility factor plays a very crucial role in 
this covert channel. Though it is quite difficult to detect this 
covert channel, on identifying the existence of this covert 
channel, the channel can be disrupted by injecting HTTP 
requests for URLs existing in the URL dictionary with source 
IP address spoofed to that of the covert message sender. 
6 Future Work 
 Though the proposed covert channel fares high on various 
characteristics, certain modifications and implementations can 
further improve the effectiveness of this channel. The message 
(word) dictionary part of the encoding/decoding mechanism 
can be improved by implementing an algorithm that would 
build the message dictionary from the webpage source on the 
basis of word occurrence frequency in the English language. 
This approach will help in ignoring words that are less likely 
to be used. Also, the implementation must be improved to 
ignore redirection of a URL to another URL that already exists 
in the URL dictionary as it might result in the transfer of 
incorrect messages. The widely varying sequence of URL 
requests would not be suspicious as it might look like a user 
browsing through different pages of a website however it 
might result in suspicion when these widely varying sequence 
of URL requests are made in a very short span of time by the 
same user. To prevent any suspicion or identification of the 
existence of this channel as a result of multiple URL requests 
from the same source in a short duration of time, the code can 




A communication channel, used to transfer secret message 
within the same system or across a network, where there is 
seemingly no communication taking place can be termed as 
covert channels. A new covert channel based on webpage 
source was exhibited in this paper. The covert channel 
presented, used words and URLs available in a webpage 
source to enable unidirectional covert communication from a 
web client to a web server. This covert channel does not 
modify the webpage source while demonstrating high 
imperceptibility and channel capacity. 
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